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The proposal for an International Investment Court is a red herring. The central issue is 
whether investment treaties should exist at all. The secondary issue is whether, if they do, 
an Investment Court is better than the present settlement of disputes through arbitration. 
The first issue is the more important one. But since the second issue has been raised, it is 
best to stop the idea at the outset. 
 
Given the disenchantment with the present investor-state dispute-settlement (ISDS) 
system, the alternative suggested, especially in recent documents of the European Union 
(EU) in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations, is 
a standing International Investment Tribunal. Does the idea cure the charges of 
illegitimacy leveled at the present ISDS system? The illegitimacy of ISDS flows, 
according to its critics, from the allegation that a select few arbitrators routinely decide 
disputes in favor of multinational enterprises in an ideologically prejudiced manner, 
articulating doctrines more extensively than agreed upon by governments negotiating the 
treaties, thereby also curtailing those governments’ regulatory functions. 
 
An Investment Court would not cure such illegitimacy. A Court would become a device 
for neoliberal rules of investment protection with even greater authority. Judges of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) have been sitting as investment arbitrators. A study of 
their record does not show that they avoid the prejudices of those arbitrators who had not 
also served as judges at such a high level. On the few occasions ICJ judges from 
developing countries sat on investment arbitration panels, they dissented from the 
(developed country) majority. 1  Having a minority of five judges from developing 
countries is no help. They are in a minority, even assuming those appointed are not 
already acculturated to the neoliberal vision. They could be strong-armed into complying 
with majority decisions. There is no indication as to the geographical areas they may 
come from or how they would be chosen. 
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Judges of domestic courts (the EU uses domestic courts as the model) are drawn from 
elite classes that have uniform views. Baroness Hale, Deputy President of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court, has observed that most top English judges are white, male, 
attended the same elite universities, and specialized in commercial law.2 Apart from the 
lack of expertise in public law issues that abound in investment arbitration, these judges, 
of whatever court, most likely have the same ideological predispositions. Judges chosen 
from other EU countries are unlikely to be different. The affirmation of slanted positions 
in a more authoritative fashion is the likely outcome of an Investment Court. 
 
Take the existing European Court of Human Rights. It has dealt with the right to property, 
an issue featuring in investment arbitration. The European Convention on Human Rights 
did not originally include that right, since socialists had problems with it. It was included 
through the first protocol to the Convention. The Court’s interpretation of that provision 
indicates that it reserves the power to apply a proportionality test to any regulatory 
interference with property rights. The proportionality rule is now used in investment 
arbitration to overcome the rule that regulatory interference does not amount to 
compensable takings. Such creativity in favor of investment protection would become 
more intense through an Investment Court. Proportionality adds to indeterminacy and 
subjectivity. Critics argue that proportionality ensures that courts impede democratic state 
functions by arrogating to themselves a continuing power to review regulation. 
 
The establishment of an Investment Court would dissociate that Court from democratic 
control. As in the case of other permanent international tribunals, the Court would 
arrogate additional powers and create regimes through precedents in the area in which it 
operates. Academic opinion supports such creative expansion into the 
constitutionalization of fragmented law. The danger is that neoliberal principles will 
become set in stone beyond the power of democratic processes. To date, there is no 
doctrine of precedent in investment arbitration. This will not be so when there is a 
permanent judicial body. 
 
The EU proposal suggests that an International Investment Court is not different from a 
domestic court. If so, why not permit existing domestic courts to perform the function of 
deciding investment disputes? They are more familiar with the circumstances in which a 
state interfered with foreign investments and can assess the fairness of the interference in 
its political and social context more effectively. This is the way chosen in South Africa 
and Brazil. Domestic courts are part of a democratic system. In the face of the experience 
of investment arbitration, the proposal to set up an Investment Court will enhance the 
worst features of the existing ISDS system. 
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